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Abstract
The study of monotonicity and negation complexity for Boolean functions has been prevalent
in complexity theory as well as in computational learning theory, but little attention has been
given to it in the cryptographic context. Recently, Goldreich and Izsak (2012) have initiated a
study of whether cryptographic primitives can be monotone, and showed that one-way functions
can be monotone (assuming they exist), but a pseudorandom generator cannot.
In this paper, we start by filling in the picture and proving that many other basic crypto-
graphic primitives cannot be monotone. We then initiate a quantitative study of the power of
negations, asking how many negations are required. We provide several lower bounds, some of
them tight, for various cryptographic primitives and building blocks including one-way permu-
tations, pseudorandom functions, small-bias generators, hard-core predicates, error-correcting
codes, and randomness extractors. Among our results, we highlight the following.
• Unlike one-way functions, one-way permutations cannot be monotone.
• We prove that pseudorandom functions require log n − O(1) negations (which is optimal
up to the additive term).
• Error-correcting codes with optimal distance parameters require log n − O(1) negations
(again, optimal up to the additive term).
• We prove a general result for monotone functions, showing a lower bound on the depth of
any circuit with t negations on the bottom that computes a monotone function f in terms
of the monotone circuit depth of f .
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1 Introduction
Why do block ciphers like AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) have so many XOR gates
dispersed throughout the levels of its circuit? Can we build a universal hard-core bit alternative
to the Goldreich and Levin one [GL89] that only applies a small (say, constant) number of XORs?
Why does the Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [GGM86] construction of a pseudorandom function
(PRF) from a pseudorandom generator (PRG) heavily rely on selection functions, and calls the PRG
many times? Could there be a monotone construction of a PRF from a PRG?
These are a few of the many fascinating questions related to the negation complexity of cryp-
tographic primitives. The negation complexity of a boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is the
minimum number of negation gates in any fan-in two circuit with AND, OR, and NOT gates com-
puting f . Note that negation gates are equivalent to XOR gates (of fan-in 2), in the sense that any
circuit with t negation gates can be transformed into an equivalent circuit with t XOR gates, and
vice-versa.1 A function is monotone if and only if its negation complexity is 0.
In this paper, we initiate the investigation of the negation complexity of cryptographic prim-
itives. We take first steps in this study, providing some surprising results, as well as pointing to
some basic, intriguing problems that are still open.
This direction fits within the larger program of studying how simple basic cryptographic prim-
itives can be, according to various complexity measures such as required assumptions, minimal
circuit size, depth, etc (see, e.g., [AIK06]). Exploring such questions helps gaining a deeper theo-
retical understanding of fundamental primitives and the relationships among them, and may provide
the basis for understanding and addressing practical considerations as well.
While the study of monotone classes of functions and negation complexity has been prevalent in
circuit complexity ([Hof92, AM05, Tar88, ST04, ST02, BNT98, BNT95, Mor09b, Mor09a], to name
a few) and computational learning theory (see e.g. [BCO+14, BBL98, BT96, OW13, DLM+09]),
little attention has been given to it in the cryptographic context.
Recently, Goldreich and Izsak [GI12] have initiated a study of “cryptography in the monotone
world”, asking whether basic cryptographic primitives may be monotone. They focus on one-way
functions (OWF) and pseudorandom generators, and show an inherent gap between the two by
proving: (1) if any OWF exist, then there exist OWFs with polynomial-size monotone circuits, but
(2) no monotone function can be a PRG. Quoting from their paper: these two results indicate that
in the “monotone world” there is a fundamental gap between one-way functions and pseudorandom
generators; thus, the “hardness-vs-randomness” paradigm fails in the monotone setting. This raises
the following natural question:
Can other cryptographic primitives be computed by polynomial-size monotone circuits?
We consider this question for several primitives and building blocks, showing negative answers
for all of them. This may suggest the interpretation (or conjecture) that in the “monotone world”,
there is no cryptography except for one-way functions. We then initiate a quantitative study (where
our main contributions lie), putting forward the question:
How many negations are required (for poly-size circuits) to compute fundamental cryp-
tographic building blocks?
1¬x is equivalent to x⊕ 1, while x⊕ y is equivalent to ¬(x ∧ y) ∧ (x ∨ y).
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Markov [Mar58] proved that the negation complexity of any function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is
at most dlog(n + 1)e, and Fischer [Fis75] proved that this transformation can be made efficient
(see Jukna [Chapter 10, Juk12] for a modern exposition). In light of these results, is it the case
that all natural cryptographic primitives other than OWFs require Ω(logn) negations, or are there
primitives that can be computed with, say, a constant number of negations?
We state our results informally in the next section. Since our lower bounds hold for well-known
primitives, we postpone their definitions to Section 3.
2 Our Results
Our contributions alongside previously known results are summarized in Figure 1, together
with the main idea in each proof (the definition of these primitives can be found in Section 3). We
explain and discuss some interesting aspects of these results below, deferring complete details to
the body of the paper.
Primitive Lower Bound Upper Bound Ref. Proof Ideas
OWF - (monotone) [GI12] Direct products of middle slice
OWP non-monotone log n+O(1) here Combinatorial and analytic proofs
PRG non-monotone log n+O(1) [GI12] AND of one or two output bits
SBG non-monotone ω(1) here Extension of [GI12]; Parity of Tribes
WPRF non-monotone (12+o(1)) log n [BBL98] Weak-learner for monotone functions
PRF logn− O(1) log n+O(1) here Alternating chains in the hypercube
ECC logn− O(1) log n+O(1) here Extension of [BKS06]
HCB (1
2
−o(1)) logn (12+o(1)) log n here Low influence and [GR00]
EXT Ω(logn) log n+O(1) here Low noise-sensitivity and [BG13]
Figure 1: Summary of the negation complexity of basic cryptographic primitives and building blocks.
Boldface results correspond to new bounds obtained in this paper. The log n+O(1) upper bound is Markov’s
bound [Mar58] for any Boolean function. Error-correcting codes (ECC) and extractors (EXT) refer to
constructions with good distance and extraction parameters.
2.1 Cryptography is Non-Monotone
As mentioned above, [GI12] proved that if OWFs exist, then they can be monotone, while PRGs
cannot. We fill in the picture by considering several other cryptographic primitives, and observing
that none of them can be monotone (see Figure 1).
A result of particular interest is the lower bound showing that one-way permutations (OWP)
cannot be monotone. We obtain this result by proving that any monotone permutation f on n
variables must satisfy f(x1, . . . , xn) =
(
xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)
)
, for some permutation pi : [n]→ [n] (finding
the permutation and inverting f can then be done by evaluating f on n inputs). This is surprising
in light of the [GI12] construction for OWFs. In particular, our result can be seen as a separation
between OWFs and OWPs in the monotone world.
We provide two proofs of our result. The first is based on analytical methods, and was inspired
by an approach used by Goldreich and Izsak [GI12]. The second is more elementary, and relies on
a self-contained combinatorial argument.
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2.2 Highly Non-Monotone Primitives
We show that many central cryptographic primitives are highly non-monotone. Some of our
lower bounds demonstrate necessity of log n − O(1) negations, which is tight in light of Markov’s
log n + O(1) upper bound [Mar58]. For some of the primitives we give less tight Ω(log n) lower
bounds.
Pseudorandom Functions (PRF). We show that PRFs can only be computed by circuits
containing at least log n − O(1) negations (which is optimal up to the additive term). We
prove this by exhibiting an adversary that distinguishes any function that can be implemented
with fewer negations gates from a random function. Our result actually implies that for any
PRF family {F (w, ·)}, for almost all seeds w, F (w, ·) can only be computed by circuits with
at least log n−O(1) negations.2
The distinguisher we construct asks for the values of the function on a fixed chain from 0n to
1n and accept if the alternating number of this chain is large. We note that the distinguisher
suceeds for any function that has an implementation with fewer negations than the lower
bound, regardless of the specific implementation the PRF designer had in mind. This can be
considered as another statistical test to run on proposed candidate PRF implementations.
Error-Correcting Codes (ECC). As shown by Buresh-Oppenheim, Kabanets and Santhanam
[BKS06], if an ECC has a monotone encoding function then one can find two codewords that
are very close. This implies that there is no monotone ECC with good distance parameters.
We extend this result to show that, given a circuit with t negation gates computing the
encoding function, we can find two codewords whose Hamming distance is O(2t ·m/n) (for
codes going from n bits to m bits). Consequently, this gives a log n − O(1) lower bound on
the negation complexity of ECC with optimal distance parameters.
Hard-core Bits (HCB). Recall that a Boolean function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a hard-core
predicate for a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if, given f(x), it is hard to compute h(x). We
show that general hard-core bit predicates must be highly non-monotone. More specifically,
there exists a family of one-way functions fn for which any hard-core predicate requires
Ω(log n) negations (assuming one-way functions exist).
Our result follows via the analysis of the influence of circuits with few negations, and a
corresponding lower bound on hard-core bits due to Goldmann and Russell [GR00].
(Strong) Extractors (EXT). A strong extractor produces almost uniform bits from weak
sources of randomness, even when the truly random seed used for extraction is revealed. We
prove that any extractor function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}s → {0, 1}100 that works for (n, n1/2−ε)-
sources requires circuits with Ω(log n) negations (see Section 3 for definitions).
This proof relies on the analysis of the noise sensitivity of circuits containing negations,
together with a technique from Bogdanov and Guo [BG13].
2That is, if we consider the circuit computing the PRF family F (·, ·) as a single function (with the seed as one of
the inputs), then this circuit must have at least logarithmically many negation gates.
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2.3 Non-Trivial Upper Bound for Small-Bias Generators
The above lower bounds may suggest the possibility that, with the exception of OWFs, all
cryptographic building blocks require Ω(log n) negations. We show one example of a primitive –
small-bias generator (SBG) – that can be constructed with significantly fewer negations, namely,
with any super-constant number of negations (for example, log∗(n) such gates).
A SBG can be thought of as a weaker version of a PRG, where the output fools linear distin-
guishers (i.e., it looks random to any distinguisher that can only apply a linear test). Thus, any
PRG is also a SBG, but not vice-versa. We construct our SBG with few negations by outputting
the input and an additional bit consisting of a parity of independent copies of the Tribes function.
Since SBGs are not quite a cryptographic primitive (these can be constructed unconditionally,
and are not secure against polynomial adversaries), one may still conjecture that all “true” cryp-
tographic primitives with the exception of OWFs require Ω(log n) negations. We do not know
whether this is the case, and it would be interesting to determine whether other primitives not
covered in this paper can be monotone.
2.4 Lower Bounds for Boolean Circuits with Bottom Negations
In addition to studying specific primitives, we investigate general structural properties of circuits
with negations. We prove a theorem showing that for monotone functions, the depth of any circuit
with negations at the bottom (input) level only is lower bounded by the monotone depth complexity
of the function minus the number of negations in the circuit. This is connected to a result obtained
by Koroth and Sarma [KS14], who proved a multiplicative rather than additive lower bound, but
in a more general setting which assumes that every Boolean function computed at an internal
gate of the circuit can be computed by some circuit with few negations (see their paper for more
details). We consider the usual definition of Boolean circuits with negations at the bottom layer,
which allows us to prove a stronger trade-off. Our proof is inspired by ideas from [KS14], and
relies on a circular application of the Karchmer-Wigderson connection between boolean circuits
and communication protocols.
This result suggests that negations at the bottom layer are less powerful and easier to study.
In the Appendix we describe some techniques (following results of Blais et al. [BCO+14]) that al-
low one to decompose arbitrary computations into monotone and non-monotone components, and
provide further evidence that negations at the bottom are less powerful (see also the discussion in
Section 6).
Organization. We provide the definitions for most of the primitives mentioned in this paper
in Section 3. Basic results used later in our proofs are presented in Section 4, with some proofs
deferred to Appendix A. Our main results appear in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses some
open problems motivated by our work.
3 Preliminaries and Notation
In this section, we set up notation and define relevant concepts. We refer the reader to the
textbooks [Juk12], [AB09], [Gol07], and [KN97] for more background in circuit complexity, compu-
tational complexity, theory of cryptography, and communication complexity, respectively.
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3.1 Basic Notation
We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Given a Boolean string w, we use |w| to denote its
length, and |w|1 to denote the number of 1’s in w. Unless explicitly stated, we assume that the
underlying probability distribution in our equations is the uniform distribution over the appropriate
set. Further, we let U` denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`. We use log x to denote a
logarithm in base 2, and lnx to refer to the natural base.
Given strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we write x  y if xi ≤ yi for every i ∈ [n]. A chain X = (x1, . . . , xt)
is a monotone sequence of strings over {0, 1}n, i.e., xi  xi+1 for every i ∈ [1, t − 1]. We say that
a chain X = (x1, x2, . . . , xt) is k-alternating with respect to a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if there
exist indexes i0 < i1 < . . . < ik such that f(x
ij ) 6= f(xij+1), for every j ∈ [0, k − 1]. If this is
true for every pair of consecutive elements of the chain, we say that the chain is proper (with
respect to f). We let a(f,X ) be the size of the largest set of indexes satisfying this condition. The
alternating complexity of a Boolean function f is given by a(f)
def
= maxX a(f,X ), where X is a
chain over {0, 1}n. A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotone if f(x) ≤ f(y) whenever x  y. A
function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is monotone if every output bit of g is a monotone Boolean function.
Moreover, we say that a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is anti-monotone if f is the negation
of a monotone Boolean function.
3.2 Boolean Circuits and Negation Gates
Every Boolean circuit mentioned in this paper consists of AND, OR and NOT gates, where the
first two types of gates have fan-in two. Recall that a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is
monotone if and only if it is computed by a circuit with AND and OR gates only.
For convenience, the size of a circuit C will be measured by its number of AND and OR gates,
and will be denoted by size(C). The depth of a circuit C, denoted by depth(C), is the largest
number of AND and OR gates in any path from the output gate to an input variable. The depth
of a Boolean function f is the minimum depth of a Boolean circuit computing f . Similarly, the
depth of a monotone function f , denoted by depth+(f), is the minimum depth among all monotone
circuits computing f . We will also consider multi-output Boolean circuits that compute Boolean
functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. We stress that whenever we say that a function of this form is
computed by a circuit with t negations, it means that there exists a single circuit (with multiple
output gates) containing at most t negations computing f .
We say that a circuit contains negation gates at the bottom layer only if any NOT gate in the
circuit gets as input an input variable xi, for some i ∈ [n]. We will also say that circuits of this form
are DeMorgan circuits. Put another way, a circuit C(x) of size s with t negations at the bottom
layer can be written as D(x, (x ⊕ β)), where D is a monotone circuit of size s, β ∈ {0, 1}n with
|β|1 = t encodes the variables that appear negated in C, and x⊕ β ∈ {0, 1}n is the string obtained
via the bit-wise XOR operation. This notation is borrowed from Koroth and Sarma [KS14], which
refers to β as the orientation vector.
3.3 Complexity Measures for Boolean Functions
Given a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and an index i ∈ [n], we use Ii(f) to denote the
influence of the i-th input variable on f , i.e., Ii(f)
def
= Prx[f(x) 6= f(x⊕i)], where x⊕i denotes the
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string obtained from x by flipping its i-th coordinate. The influence of f (also known as average-
sensitivity) is defined as I(f)
def
=
∑
i∈[n] Ii(f). We say that a Boolean function f is balanced or
unbiased if Prx[f(x) = 1] = 1/2. We use NSp(f) to denote the noise sensitivity of f under noise
rate p ∈ [0, 1/2], which is defined as Pr[f(X ⊕ Y ) 6= f(X)], where X is distributed uniformly over
{0, 1}n, and Y is the p-biased binomial distribution over {0, 1}n, i.e., each coordinate of Y is set to
1 independently with probability p.
3.4 Pseudorandom Functions and Weak Pseudorandom Functions
Let Fn be the set of all Boolean functions on n variables, and F : {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}. We
say that F is an (s, ε)-secure pseudorandom function (PRF) if, for every (non-uniform) algorithm
A that can be implemented by a circuit of size at most s,∣∣∣ Pr
w∼{0,1}m
[
AF (w,·) = 1
]
− Pr
f∼Fn
[
Af = 1
] ∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
where Ah denotes the execution of A with oracle access to a Boolean function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
(circuits with access to oracle gates are defined in the natural way).
A weak pseudorandom function (WPRF) is defined similarly, except that the distinguisher only
has access to random examples of the form (x, F (w, x)), where x is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}n. In particular, any (s, ε)-secure pseudorandom function is an (s, ε)-secure weak pseudoran-
dom function, while the other direction is not necessarily true.
3.5 Pseudorandom Generators and Small-Bias Generators
A function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an (s, ε)-secure pseudorandom generator (PRG) with stretch
`
def
= m− n if for every circuit C(z1, . . . , zm) of size s,∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[C(G(x)) = 1]− Pr
y∼Um
[C(y) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
We say that a function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an ε-secure small-bias generator (SBG) with
stretch ` = m− n if, for every nonempty set S ⊆ [m],∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un, y=g(x)
[∑
i∈S
yi ≡ 1 (mod 2)
]
− 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Observe that small-bias generators can be seen as weaker pseudorandom generators that are re-
quired to be secure against linear distinguishers only. We refer the reader to Naor and Naor [NN93]
for more information about the constructions and applications of such generators.
3.6 One-Way Functions, One-Way Permutations, and Hard-Core Bits
We say that a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an (s, ε)-secure one-way function (OWF) if for
every circuit C of size at most s,
Pr
x∼Un, y=f(x)
[C(y) ∈ f−1(y)] ≤ ε.
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If m = n, we say that f is length-preserving. If in addition f is a one-to-one mapping, we say that
f is an (s, ε)-secure one-way permutation (OWP).
We say that a function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is an (s, ε)-secure hard-core bit for a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m if, for every circuit C of size s,∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[C(f(x)) = h(x)]− 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
3.7 Extractors and Error-Correcting Codes
The min-entropy of a random variable X, denoted by H∞(X), is the largest real number k
such that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k for every x in the range of X. A distribution X over {0, 1}n with
H∞(X) ≥ k is said to be an (n, k)-source. Given random variables X and Y with range {0, 1}m,
we let
δ(X,Y )
def
= max
S⊆{0,1}m
∣∣Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]∣∣
denote their statistical distance. We say that X and Y are ε-close if δ(X,Y ) ≤ ε.
We say that a function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m is a (strong) (k, ε)-extractor (EXT) if,
for any (n, k)-source X, the distributions Us+m and (Us,Ext(X,Us)) are ε-close.3
Given strings y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}m, we let
∆(y1, y2)
def
=
|{i ∈ [m] | y1i 6= y2i }|
m
be their relative Hamming distance. Given a function E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, we say that E has
relative distance γ if for every distinct pair of inputs x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n, we have ∆(E(x1), E(x2)) ≥ γ.
As a convention, we will refer to a function of this form as an error-correcting code (ECC) whenever
we are interested in the distance between its output strings (also known as “codewords”).
4 Basic Results and Technical Background
4.1 Karchmer-Wigderson Communication Games
Karchmer-Wigderson games [KW88] are a powerful tool in the study of circuit depth complexity.
We focus here on games for monotone functions. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone function,
and consider the following deterministic communication game between two players named Alice
and Bob. Alice gets an input x ∈ f−1(1), while Bob receives y ∈ f−1(0). The goal of the players
is to communicate the minimum number of bits (using an interactive protocol), and to output a
coordinate i ∈ [n] for which xi = 1 and yi = 0. The monotonicity assumption on f guarantees that
such coordinate always exists.
Proposition 4.1 (Karchmer and Wigderson [KW88]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone
function. There exists a monotone circuit Cf of depth d that computes f if, and only if, there
exists a protocol Πf for the (monotone) KW-game of f with communication cost d.
3Two occurrences of the same random variable in an expression refer to the same copy of the variable.
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4.2 Markov’s Upper Bound
The following result was obtained by Markov [Mar58].
Proposition 4.2 (Markov [Mar58]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be an arbitrary function. Then f is
computed by a (multi-output) Boolean circuit containing at most dlog(n+ 1)e negations.
This result implies that many of our lower bounds are tight up to an additive term independent of n.
Some of our proofs also rely on the following relation between negation complexity and alternation.
Proposition 4.3 (Markov [Mar58]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by a
circuit with at most t negations. Then a(f) = O(2t).
4.3 The Flow of Negation Gates
It is useful in some situations to decompose the computation of a function into monotone
and non-monotone components. This idea has been applied successfully to obtain almost optimal
bounds on the learnability of functions computed with few negation gates (Blais et al. [BCO+14]).
An important lemma used in their paper can be stated as follows.
Lemma 4.4 (Blais et al. [BCO+14]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by
a circuit C with at most t negations. Then f can be written as f(x) = h(g1(x), . . . , gT (x)), where
each function gi is monotone, T = O(2
t), and h is either the parity function, or its negation.
A drawback of this statement is that the computational complexity of each gi is not related
to the size of C. Roughly speaking, the proof of this result uses a circuit for f in order to gain
structural information about f , and then rely on a non-constructive argument. We observe that,
by relaxing the assumption on h, we can prove the following effective version of Lemma 4.4.4
Lemma 4.5. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by a circuit C of size s
containing t negation gates. Then f can be written as f(x) = h(g1(x), . . . , gT (x)), where each
function gi is computed by a monotone circuit of size at most s, T = 2
t+1 − 1, and h : {0, 1}T →
{0, 1} is computed by a circuit of size at most 5T .
We state below a more explicit version of Lemma 4.5 for circuits with a single negation gate
and several output bits. The proof of this result follows from the same argument used to derive
Lemma 4.5, whose proof we give in Section A.
Lemma 4.6. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}u be computed by a circuit of size s containing a single negation
gate. Assume that the j-th output bit of f is computed by the function fj : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Then,
there exist monotone functions m : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and mj,` : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, where j ∈ [u] and
` ∈ {0, 1}, which are computed by monotone circuits of size at most s, and a function h : {0, 1}3 →
{0, 1}, such that:
(i) For every j ∈ [u], fj(x) = h(m(x),mj,0(x),mj,1(x)).
(ii) For every j ∈ [u] and x ∈ {0, 1}n, mj,0(x) ≤ mj,1(x).
(iii) The function h is defined as h(z, y1, y0)
def
= yz.
4This result was obtained during a discussion with Clement Canonne, Li-Yang Tan, and Rocco Servedio.
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From a programming perspective, Lemma 4.6 shows that a single negation gate in a Boolean
circuit can be interpreted as an if-then-else statement involving monotone functions. Conversely,
the selection procedure computed by h can be implemented with a single negation.
For convenience of the reader, we sketch the proof of these results in Section A, where we also
discuss the expressiveness of negations at arbitrary locations compared to negations at the bottom
layer of a circuit. Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 can be used interchangeably in our proofs.
4.4 Useful Inequalities
Some of our proofs rely on the following results for Boolean functions.
Proposition 4.7 (Fortuin, Kasteleyn, and Ginibre [FKG71]). If g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} are monotone Boolean functions, then
Pr
x
[f(x) = 1 ∧ g(x) = 1] ≥ Pr
x
[f(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[g(x) = 1].
The same inequality holds for anti-monotone functions. In particular, for monotone f, g : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}, following inequality holds
Pr
x
[f(x) = 0 ∧ g(x) = 0] ≥ Pr
x
[f(x) = 0] · Pr
x
[g(x) = 0].
A stronger version of this inequality that will be used in some of our proofs is presented below.
Proposition 4.8 (Talagrand [Tal96]). For any pair of monotone Boolean functions f, g : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}, it holds that
Pr
x
[f(x) = 1 ∧ g(x) = 1] ≥ Pr
x
[f(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[g(x) = 1] + ψ
(∑
i∈[n]
Ii(f) · Ii(g)
)
,
where ψ(x)
def
= c · x/ log (e/x), and c > 0 is a fixed constant independent of n.
Proposition 4.9 (Kahn, Kalai, and Linial [KKL88]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a balanced Boolean
function. Then there exists an index i ∈ [n] such that Ii(f) = Ω
(
logn
n
)
.
Finally, we will make use of the following standard concentration bound (cf. Alon and Spencer
[AS08]).
Proposition 4.10. Let X1, . . . , Xm be independent {0, 1} random variables, where each Xi is 1
with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, set X def= ∑iXi, and µ def= E[X] = pm. Then, for any fixed
ζ > 0, there exists a constant cζ > 0 such that
Pr[ |X − µ| > ζµ] < 2e−cζµ.
5 Main Results
5.1 One-Way Functions versus One-Way Permutations
Goldreich and Izsak [GI12] proved that if one-way functions exist, then there are monotone
one-way functions. We show below that this is not true for one-way permutations. In other
words, one-way permutations are inherently non-monotone. This lower bound follows easily via the
following structural result for monotone permutations.
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Proposition 5.1. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-to-one function. If f is monotone, then
there exists a permutation pi : [n] → [n] such that, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x) = xpi(1) . . . xpi(n). In
particular, there exists a (uniform) polynomial size circuit that inverts f on every input y = f(x).
Proof. Let fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the Boolean function corresponding to the i-th output bit of f .
Since f is monotone, each function fi is monotone. Consider now functions f` and fk, where ` 6= k.
By Talagrand’s inequality (Proposition 4.8),
Pr
x
[f`(x) = 1 ∧ fk(x) = 1] ≥ Pr
x
[f`(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[fk(x) = 1] + ψ
(∑
i∈[n]
Ii(f`) · Ii(fk)
)
. (1)
Since f is a permutation, Prx[f`(x) = 1 ∧ fk(x) = 1] = 1/4 and Prx[f`(x) = 1] = Prx[fk(x) = 1] =
1/2. Consequently, it follows from Equation 1 and the definition of ψ that∑
i∈[n]
Ii(f`) · Ii(fk) = 0.
In other words, f` and fk depend on a disjoint set of input variables. Since this is true for every
pair ` and k with ` 6= k, and every output bit of f is non-constant, there exists a permutation
pi : [n]→ [n] such that, for every i, j ∈ [n], if Ii(fj) > 0 then i = pi(j). Moreover, as f is monotone
and one-to-one, we must have fj(x) = xpi(j), for every j ∈ [n]. The corresponding permutation can
be easily recovered from f by evaluating this function on every indicator string ei ∈ {0, 1}n, where
eij = 1 if and only if i = j. This completes the proof of our result.
We remark that a simple extension of this proof allows us to rule out monotone one-way functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−k where each pre-image set f−1(x) has size exactly 2k (i.e., regular OWFs),
and some relaxations of this notion.
Proposition 5.1 implies that any circuit computing a one-way permutation contains at least
one negation gate. It is not clear how to extend its proof to obtain a stronger lower bound on
the negation complexity of one-way permutations, as Talagrand’s inequality holds for monotone
functions only. Although we leave open the problem of obtaining better lower bounds, we give next
an alternative proof of Proposition 5.1 that does not rely on Talagrand’s result.
Proof. Let Sk
def
= {x ∈ {0, 1}n | |x|1 = k}, where k ∈ [0, n]. In other words, Sk is simply the k-th
slice of the n-dimensional Boolean hypercube. Initially, we prove the following claim: For every set
Sk, f(Sk) = Sk. In other words, f induces a permutation over each set of inputs Sk. We then use
this result to establish Proposition 5.1.
First, observe that f(0n) = 0n. Otherwise, there exists an input x 6= 0n such that f(x) = 0n.
Since 0n  x and f is monotone, we get that f(0n)  f(x), which contradicts the injectivity of f .
This establishes the claim for S0. The general case follows by induction on k. Assume the result
holds for any k′ < k, and consider an arbitrary y ∈ Sk. Since f is one-to-one, there exists x ∈ S`
such that f(x) = y, where ` ≥ k. If ` 6= k, there exists x′ ≺ x such that x′ ∈ Sk. Let y′ def= f(x′).
Using that f is monotone and x′ ≺ x, we get that y′  y. Since f is one-to-one, y′ ≺ y, thus
y′ ∈ Sk′ for some k′ < k. This is in contradiction with our induction hypothesis and the injectivity
of f , since f(Sk′) = Sk′ , x
′ ∈ Sk, and y′ = f(x′) ∈ Sk′ . This completes the induction hypothesis,
and the proof of our claim.
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Now let pi : [n] → [n] be the permutation such that f−1(ei) = epi(i), where ej ∈ {0, 1}n is the
input with 1 at the j-th coordinate only. Clearly, for every x ∈ S0 ∪S1, f(x) = xpi(1) . . . , xpi(n). On
the other hand, for every x ∈ Sk with k > 1, it follows from the monotonicity of f that∨
i :xi=1
f(ei)  f(x),
where the disjunction is done coordinate-wise. Finally, it follows from our previous claim that we
must also have f(x) ∈ S|x|1 . Therefore, ∨
i :xi=1
f(ei) = f(x).
Consequently, for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, it follows that f(x) = xpi(1) . . . xpi(n), which completes the
proof.
5.2 Pseudorandom Generators and Small-Bias Generators
In contrast to the situation for one-way functions, Goldreich and Izsak [GI12] presented an
elegant proof that pseudorandom generators cannot be monotone. More specifically, their result
shows that the output distribution of a monotone function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+1 can be distin-
guished from random either by the projection of one of its output bits, or via the conjunction of
two output bits.
Recall from Section 3 that small-bias generators can be seen as restricted pseudorandom gen-
erators that are only required to be secure against linear tests. We prove next that the techniques
from [GI12] can be used to show that there are no (1/nω(1))-secure monotone small-bias generators
with 1 bit of stretch. We observe later in this section that such generators can be constructed with
any super-constant number of negation gates.
Proposition 5.2. For any monotone function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+1, there exists a (non-uniform)
linear test D : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1} such that∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[D(G(x)) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣∣ = Ω( 1
n2
)
.
Proof. The proof follows closely the argument in [GI12], combined with an appropriate applica-
tion of the FKG inequality (Proposition 4.7). Let Gi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the Boolean function
corresponding to the i-th output bit of G, where i ∈ [n+1]. Observe that if there exists i such that∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[Gi(x) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣∣ = Ω( 1
n2
)
,
then there is a trivial linear distinguisher for G.
Assume therefore that, for every i ∈ [n+ 1], Gi is almost balanced. In particular, each function
Gi is δ(n)-close under the uniform distribution to an unbiased function G˜i : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1},
where δ(n) = o((log n)/n). It follows from Proposition 4.9 that each function G˜i has an influential
variable. More precisely, there exists γ : [n+ 1]→ [n] such that
Iγ(i)(G˜i) = Ω
(
log n
n
)
,
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for every i ∈ [n+ 1]. As each Gi is δ(n)-close to G˜i, it follows that Iγ(i)(Gi) = Ω
(
logn
n
)
as well.
By the pigeonhole principle, there exist distinct indexes i and j such that γ(i) = γ(j). It follows
from Proposition 4.8 that
Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1 ∧Gj(x) = 1] ≥ Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 1] + ψ
( ∑
k∈[n]
Ik(Gi) · Ik(Gk)
)
≥ Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 1] + Ω
(
ψ
( log2 n
n2
))
≥ Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 1] + Ω
( log n
n2
)
.
On the other hand, Proposition 4.7 implies that
Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 0 ∧Gj(x) = 0] ≥ Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 0] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 0].
Combining both inequalities, and using the assumption that each output bit ofG is almost balanced,
we get that:
Pr
x
[Gi(x) +Gj(x) = 0] = Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1 ∧Gj(x) = 1] + Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 0 ∧Gj(x) = 0]
≥ Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 1] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 1] + Pr
x
[Gi(x) = 0] · Pr
x
[Gj(x) = 0] + Ω
( log n
n2
)
≥ 1
2
−O
(
1
n2
)
+ Ω
( log n
n2
)
=
1
2
+ Ω
( log n
n2
)
.
Therefore, the linear function D(y)
def
= yi + yj can distinguish the output of G from random with
the desired advantage, which completes the proof.
In contrast, we show next that there are small-bias generators with super-polynomial security
that can be computed with any super-constant number of negations. Let Tribess,t : {0, 1}s·t → {0, 1}
be the (monotone) Boolean function defined as
Tribess,t(x1, . . . , xs·t) =
s−1∨
i=0
t∧
j=1
xi·t+j .
Further, we use Tribesm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} to denote the function Tribess,t, where s is the largest
integer such that 1 − (1 − 2−t)s ≤ 1/2, and t = m/s (i.e., we try to make Tribes as balanced as
possible as a function over m variables).
Proposition 5.3. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be defined as f(x) def= ⊕ki=1Tribesn/k(x(i)), where x(i)
denotes the i-th block of x with length n/k. Let 1 ≤ k(n) ≤ n/ log n, and G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+1 be
defined by G(x)
def
= (x, f(x)), Then, there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for any linear function
D : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1}, ∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[D(G(x)) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ (C · (k/n) · log(n/k))k .
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In particular, when k = ω(1), we can get a small-bias generator with negligible error that can be
computed with roughly log k negations (via Proposition 4.2). Interestingly, for k = 2 we obtain an
SBG computed with a single negation and security Θ˜(n−2), essentially matching the lower bound
for monotone SBGs given by Proposition 5.2.
Proof. We assume the reader is familiar with basic concepts from analysis of Boolean functions (cf.
O’Donnell [O’D14]). Suppose that D(y)
def
=
∑
i∈S yi (mod 2), where S ⊆ [n + 1] is nonempty. If
n+1 /∈ S, using that the first n output bits of G are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n, we get that
|Prx[D(G(x)) = 1]− 1/2 | = 0. Assume therefore that n+ 1 ∈ S, and let S′ def= S\{n+ 1}. Then,∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[
D(G(x)) = 1
]
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ Prx∼Un
[
f(x) +
∑
i∈S′
xi ≡ 1 (mod 2)
]
− 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ Pr
x∼Un
[∑
i∈S′
xi 6≡ f(x) (mod 2)
]
− 1
2
∣∣∣
def
= p.
Let f− : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be the corresponding version of f where we map 0 to 1, and 1 to
−1, as usual. Observe that, under this correspondence,∑
i∈S′
xi 6≡ f(x) (mod 2) ⇐⇒ χS′(x) · f−(x) = −1.
Therefore,
p =
∣∣∣(1
2
− 1
2
· Ex∼{−1,1}n
[
χS′(x) · f−(x)
])− 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(1
2
− 1
2
· f̂−(S′)
)
− 1
2
∣∣∣
=
1
2
· |f̂−(S′)|.
In other words, in order to upper bound the distinguishing probability p, it is enough to upper
bound |f̂−(S′)|, where S′ ⊆ [n]. Using f−(x) = ∏i∈[k] Tribes−n/k(x(i)) and that x(i) and x(j) are
disjoint for i 6= j, it follows that f̂−(S′) is a product of Fourier coefficients of the corresponding
Tribes functions. It is known that
max
T⊆[m]
∣∣T̂ribes−m(T )∣∣ = O( logmm
)
as m→∞ (see e.g. O’Donnell [O’D14]). Consequently, since we have m = n/k, we get that
p =
1
2
· |f̂−(S′)| ≤ 1
2
· max
T⊆[n/k]
∣∣ ̂Tribes−n/k(T )∣∣k ≤ (C · (k/n) · log(n/k))k ,
for an appropriate constant C.
It is possible to use other monotone functions for the construction in Proposition 5.3, but our
analysis provides better parameters with Tribes.
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5.3 Pseudorandom Functions
In this section we prove that a pseudorandon function is a highly non-monotone cryptographic
primitive. For simplicity, we will not state the most general version of our result. We discuss some
extensions after its proof.
Proposition 5.4. If F : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a (poly(n), 1/3)-secure pseudorandom func-
tion, then any Boolean circuit computing F contains at least log n−O(1) negation gates.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm Dh that has membership access to an arbitrary function
h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and computes as follows. Let X def= (e0, e1, . . . , en) be the chain over {0, 1}n
with ei
def
= 1i0n−i. After querying h on each input e0, . . . , en and computing a(h,X ), D accepts h
if and only if a(h,X ) ≥ n/4. This completes the description of D. Clearly, this algorithm can be
implemented in polynomial time.
Observe that if f ∼ Fn is a random Boolean function over n variables, then Ef [a(f,X )] = n/2.
In addition, it follows from a standard application of Proposition 4.10 that |a(f,X ) − n/2| ≤
n/4 with probability exponentially close to 1. Therefore, under our assumption that F is a
(poly(n), 1/3)-secure pseudorandom function,
1
3
≥
∣∣∣ Pr
w∼{0,1}n
[DF (w,·) = 1]− Pr
f∼Fn
[Df = 1]
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣ Pr
w∼{0,1}n
[DF (w,·) = 1]− (1− o(1))
∣∣∣,
which implies in particular that Pr[DF (w,·) = 1] ≥ 2/3−o(1). Therefore, there must exist some seed
w∗ for which the resulting function Fw∗
def
= F (w∗, ·) over n-bit inputs satisfies a(Fw∗ ,X ) ≥ n/4. It
follows from Proposition 4.3 that if C is a circuit with t negations computing Fw∗ , then
n/4 ≤ a(Fw∗ ,X ) ≤ a(Fw∗) ≤ c · 2t,
where c is a fixed positive constant. Consequently, t ≥ log n − O(1). Finally, it is clear that any
circuit for F also requires log n−O(1) negations, which completes the proof.
Note that we can replace 1/3 with any constant in [0, 1). The proof of Proposition 5.4 also
implies that if F is a sufficiently secure pseudorandom function, then for most choices of the seed
w ∈ {0, 1}m, the resulting function F (w, ·) over n input variables requires log n − O(1) negations.
Further, observe that our distinguisher is quite simple, and makes n+ 1 non-adaptive queries.
The same proof does not work for weak pseudorandom functions. In this case, most random
examples obtained from the oracle are concentrated around the middle layer of the hypercube, and
one cannot construct a chain. We remark, however, that weak pseudorandom functions cannot be
monotone, as there are weak learning algorithms for the class of monotone functions (cf. Blum,
Burch, and Langford [BBL98]). We discuss the problem of obtaining better lower bounds for
WPRFs in Section 6. (The upper bound on the negation complexity of WPRFs follows via standard
techniques, see Section 5.5 and Blais et al. [BCO+14].)
5.4 Error-Correcting Codes
In this section, we show that circuits with few negations cannot compute error-correcting codes
with good parameters. The proof generalizes the argument given by Buresh-Oppenheim, Kabanets
and Santhanam [BKS06] in the case of monotone error-correcting codes.
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Proposition 5.5. Let E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be an error-correcting code with relative distance
γ > 0. If C is a circuit with t negations that computes E, then t ≥ log n− log(1/γ)− 1.
Proof. Assume that E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is computed by a (multi-output) circuit C0 with t nega-
tion gates, and let x1, . . . , xn be its input variables. For convenience, we write C
0
i to denote the
Boolean function computed by the i-th output gate of C0. We proceed as in the proof of Lemma
4.5. More precisely, we remove one negation gate during each step, but here we also inspect the be-
havior of the error-correcting code on a particular set of inputs of interest. Let X def= (e0, e1, . . . , en)
be the chain over {0, 1}n with ei def= 1i0n−i.
It follows from an easy generalization of Lemma 4.6 that there exist functions f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}, h : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1}, and gi,b : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, where i ∈ [m] and b ∈ {0, 1}, for which the
following holds.
• f is monotone;
• h is the addressing function h(a, d0, d1) def= da;
• for every x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [m],
E(x)i = h(f(x), gi,0(x), gi,1(x)).
• there exist (multi-output) circuits C1,0 and C1,1 over input variables x1, . . . , xn such that, for
every i ∈ [m] and b ∈ {0, 1},
C1,b(x)i = gi,b(x).
• each circuit C1,b contains at most t− 1 negations.
Since e0 ≺ e1 ≺ . . . ≺ en and f is monotone, there exists k ∈ [0, n] such that f(e`) = 0 if and
only if ` < k. By the pigeonhole principle, f is constant on a (continuous) subchain X 1 ⊆ X of size
at least (n+ 1)/2, and there exists a constant b ∈ {0, 1} such that
E(ei) = g1,b(e
i) . . . gm,b(e
i),
whenever ei ∈ X 1. Consequently, there exists a (multi-output) circuit C1 computed with at most
t− 1 negations that agrees with E on every ei ∈ X 1.
Observe that this argument can be applied once again with respect to X 1 and C1. Therefore,
it is not hard to see that there must exist a chain X t ⊆ X of size w ≥ (n+ 1)/2t and a monotone
(multi-output) circuit Ct such that
Ct(ei) = E(ei),
for every ei ∈ X t.
Assume that X t = (ej , ej+1, . . . , ej+w−1), and let Y def= (yj , . . . , yj+w−1), where yi def= E(ei).
Since Ct is monotone and X t is a chain over {0, 1}n, we get that Y is a chain over {0, 1}m. By
the pigeonhole principle, there exists an index k ∈ [j + 1, j + w − 1] for which yj−1  yj and
|yj |1 − |yj−1|1 ≤ (m + 1)/w. Now using that E computes an error-correcting code of relative
distance at least γ, it follows that
γ ≤ ∆(yj , yj−1) ≤ m+ 1
w
· 1
m
≤ 2
t
n+ 1
· m+ 1
m
,
which completes the proof of our result.
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It is possible to show via a simple probabilistic construction that there is a sequence of error-
correcting codes En : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}O(n) with relative distance, say, γ = 0.01 (see e.g. Arora and
Barak [AB09]). Proposition 5.5 implies that computing such codes requires at least log n − O(1)
negation gates, which is optimal up to the additive term via Markov’s upper bound (Proposition
4.2).
5.5 Hard-Core Bits
We prove in this section that general hard-core predicates must be highly non-monotone. This
result follows from a lower bound on the average-sensitivity of such functions due to Goldmann
and Russell [GR00], together with structural results about monotone Boolean functions and Lemma
4.4. Roughly speaking, our result says that there are one-way functions that do not admit hardcore
predicates computed with less than (1/2) · log n negations (assuming that one-way functions exist).
Proposition 5.6. Assume that there exists a family f = {fn}n∈N of (poly(n), n−ω(1))-secure one-
way functions, where each fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Then, for every ε > 0, there exists a family gε =
{gn}n∈N of (length-preserving) (poly(n), n−ω(1))-secure one-way functions for which the following
holds. If h = {hn}n∈N is a (poly(n), n−ω(1))-secure hard-core bit for gε, then for every n sufficiently
large, any Boolean circuit computing hn contains at least (1/2− ε) log n negations.
Proof. It follows from the main result of Goldmann and Russell [GR00] that under the existence of
one-way functions, there exists a one-way function family gδ = {gn}n∈N that only admits hard-core
bit predicates with average-sensitivity Ω(n1−δ). Our result follows easily once we observe that the
average-sensitivity of Boolean functions computed with t negations is O(2t · √n).5
First, if f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a monotone Boolean function, then I(f) = O(√n) (see e.g.
O’Donnell [O’D14]). On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 4.4 that any Boolean func-
tion h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} computed by a circuit with t negation gates can be written as h(x) =
P (m1(x), . . . ,mT (x)), where T = O(2
t), each function mi is monotone, and P is either the parity
function or its negation. Therefore, using the definition of influence,
I(h) = I(P (m1, . . . ,mT )) ≤
∑
i∈[T ]
I(mi) ≤ T ·O(
√
n) = O(2t · √n),
which completes the proof.
This result is almost optimal, as any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be (1/nω(1))-approximated
by a Boolean function computed with (1/2 + o(1)) log n negations (check Blais et al. [BCO+14] for
more details). More precisely, if h is a hard-core bit for f , its approximator h˜ is also hard-core for
f , as the inputs f(x) given to the distinguisher are produced with x ∼ Un.
5.6 Randomness Extractors
In this section, we show in Proposition 5.8 that strong (n0.5−ε, 1/2)-extractors can only be
computed by circuits with Ω(log n) negation gates, for any constant 0 < ε ≤ 1/2. We proceed
as follows. First, we argue that such extractors must have high noise sensitivity. The proof of
this result employs a technique from Bogdanov and Guo [BG13]. We then upper bound the noise
5This result is from Blais et al. [BCO+14], and we include its short argument here for completeness.
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sensitivity of circuits with few negations. Together, these claims provide a trade-off between the
parameters of the extractor, and the minimum number of negations in any circuit computing the
extractor.
For convenience, we view the extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}s → {0, 1}m as a family of functions
HExt def= {hw : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m | hw = Ext(·, w), where w ∈ {0, 1}s},
i.e., the family of functions obtained from the extractor by fixing its seed. Similarly, every such
family can be viewed as a strong extractor in the natural way.
Lemma 5.7. Let 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1/4, and H ⊆ {h | h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} be a family of
functions. Assume that NSp(hi) ≤ γ for every function hi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that computes the i-th
output bit of some function in H, where i ∈ [m]. Then there exists a distribution D over {0, 1}n
with min-entropy H∞(D) = n · log( 11−p) such that the statistical distance between (H,H(D)) and
(H,Um) is at least (1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ).
Proof. For a fixed y ∈ {0, 1}n, letDy denote a random variable distributed according to y⊕X, where
X is the p-biased binomial distribution over {0, 1}n. Since p ≤ 1/2, observe that the min-entropy
of Dy is precisely
H∞(Dy) = − log max
z∈{0,1}n
Pr[y ⊕X = z] = − log Pr[y ⊕ X = y]
= − log (1− p)n = n · log
(
1
1− p
)
.
We will need the following result.
Claim. For any fixed h ∈ H,
Ey∼{0,1}n [δ(h(Dy),Um)] ≥ (1− 2
√
γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ). (2)
We use this claim to complete the demonstration of Lemma 5.7, then return to its proof. Observe
that, for any fixed y ∈ {0, 1}n,
δ((H,H(Dy)), (H,Um)) = Eh∼H[δ(h(Dy),Um)]. (3)
It follows from Equation 3 that
Ey∼{0,1}n [δ((H,H(Dy)), (H,Um))] = Ey∼{0,1}n [Eh∼H[δ(h(Dy),Um)]]
= Eh[Ey[δ(h(Dy),Um)]]
(Using Equation 2) ≥ Eh[(1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ)]
= (1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ).
In particular, there exists y ∈ {0, 1}n such that
δ((H,H(Dy)), (H,Um)) ≥ (1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ),
which completes the proof of Lemma 5.7.
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We proceed now to the proof of our initial claim. Fix a function h ∈ H. By the definition of
noise sensitivity and our assumption on H, for every function hi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} obtained from a
function h ∈ H as the projection of the i-th output bit, we have
Pr
y
[hi(Dy) 6= hi(y)] = Pr
y
[hi(y ⊕X) 6= hi(y)] ≤ γ.
Using the linearity of expectation, we obtain
Ey[∆(h(Dy), h(y))] ≤ γ.
By Markov’s inequality,
Pr
y
[∆(h(Dy), h(y)) ≤ 1/4] ≥ 1− 4γ.
Using an averaging argument, with probability at least 1−√4γ over the choice of y, we have that
Pr[∆(h(Dy), h(y)) ≤ 1/4] ≥ 1−
√
4γ. (4)
For any fixed y, consider the following statistical test,
Ty
def
= {z ∈ {0, 1}m | ∆(z, h(y)) ≤ 1/4}.
The probability that Um ∈ Ty can be upper bounded via a standard inequality by
Pr
z∼Um
[z ∈ Ty] ≤ 2
m·H2(1/4)
2m
≤ 2−0.1m, (5)
where H2 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the binary entropy function, and we use the fact that H2(1/4) ≤ 0.9.
Combining Equations 4 and 5, we get
Pr
y
[
(Pr
X
[h(Dy) ∈ Ty]− Pr
z∼Um
[z ∈ Ty]) ≥ 1−
√
4γ − 2−0.1m] ≥ 1−√4γ,
which implies that
Pr
y
[δ(h(Dy),Um) ≥ 1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m] ≥ 1− 2√γ.
Finally, since δ(·) is non-negative and γ ≤ 1/4, it follows that
Ey[δ(h(Dy),Um)] ≥ (1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ),
which completes the proof of the claim.
We are now ready to prove a lower bound on the negation complexity of strong extractors.
Proposition 5.8. Let 0 < α < 1/2 be a constant, and m(n) ≥ 100. Further, suppose that H ⊆
{h | h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} is a family of functions such that each output bit hi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} of
a function h ∈ H is computed by a circuit with t negations. Then, if H is an (n 12−α, 1/2)-extractor,
t ≥ α log n−O(1).
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Proof. It is known that for any monotone function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and p(n) ∈ (0, 1/2), NSp(g) =
O(
√
n · p) (see e.g. O’Donnell [O’D14]). Using an argument similar to the one employed in the
proof of Proposition 5.6, it follows from Lemma 4.4 that if f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a Boolean function
computed by a circuit with t negations, then
NSp(f) ≤ C1 · 2t
√
n · p def= γ,
where C1 > 0 is a fixed constant. In other words, this upper bound on the noise sensitivity and our
assumption on H allow us to apply Lemma 5.7 with an appropriate choice of parameters, which we
describe next.
We choose a 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 such that n · log 1(1−p) = n
1
2
−α. Observe that we can take p ≤ C2n− 12−α,
for an appropriate constant C2 > 0. Let C3 be a sufficiently large constant such that C1C22
−C3 <
1/64, and suppose that t < α log n− C3. For this setting of parameters, we obtain
γ = C1 · 2t ·
√
n · p < 1
64
.
By Lemma 5.7, there exists a distribution D of min-entropy H∞(D) = n log 11−p = n
1
2
−α for which
δ((H,H(D)), (H,Um)) ≥ (1− 2√γ − 2−0.1m)(1− 2√γ)
> (
3
4
− 2−0.1m) · 3
4
≥ 1
2
,
which contradicts our assumption that H is an (n 12−α, 1/2)-extractor. Therefore,
t ≥ α log n− C3 = α log n−O(1),
as desired.
Observe that Proposition 5.8 provides an almost tight lower bound on the number of negations
for extractors with rather weak parameters: in order to extract from reasonable sources only 100
bits that are not ridiculously far from uniform, the corresponding circuits need Ω(log n) negations.
5.7 Negations at the Bottom Layer and Circuit Lower Bounds
In this section we investigate the power of a restricted number of negations at the bottom layer.
As discussed in Section 5.7, our proof relies on an idea from Koroth and Sarma [KS14]. Our main
contribution is the following general proposition.
Proposition 5.9. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone Boolean function, and C be a circuit
computing f with negation gates at the bottom layer only. Then,
depth(C) + negations(C) ≥ depth+(f).
Proof. Let d
def
= depth(C), and t
def
= negations(C). The idea is to use C, a non-monotone circuit
for f , to solve the corresponding monotone Karchmer-Wigderson game of f with communication
at most d + t. It follows from Proposition 4.1 that depth+(f) ≤ d + t, which completes the proof.
More details follow.
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Recall that in the monotone Karchmer-Wigderson game for f , Alice is given a string x ∈ f−1(1),
Bob is given y ∈ f−1(0), and their goal is to agree on a coordinate i such that xi = 1 and yi = 0. Let
T ⊂ [n] be the set of variables that occur negated in C, where |T | = t. Given a string x ∈ {0, 1}n,
we write xT to denote the substring of x obtained by concatenating the bits indexed by T . During
the first round of the protocol, Alice sends xT to Bob.
Bob defines a new input y′ ∈ {0, 1}n for him as follows: y′j def= xj if j ∈ T and xj = 0, otherwise
y′j
def
= yj . For convenience, Alice sets x
′ def= x. It is not hard to see that f(y′) ≤ f(y) = 0, since f is
monotone and y′ ≤ y.
Note that the circuit C defines a monotone circuit C˜ over n+ t variables z1, . . . , zn+t. We use
z(x′) to denote the inputs to C˜ when C is given inputs x′. Alice and Bob simulate together the
standard Karchmer-Wigderson protocol Π granted by Proposition 4.1 with circuit C˜, inputs z(x′)
and z(y′), and obtain an index j ∈ [n + t] for which zj(x′) = 1 and zj(y′) = 0. In particular, it
implies that Alice and Bod find an index i ∈ [n] such that x′i = 1 and y′i = 0 or their negated values
are x′i = 1 and y
′
i = 0. For negated variables, it holds that x
′
i = y
′
i = 1 by the definition of x
′
i and
y′i. Therefore, only x
′
i = 1 and y
′
i = 0 can happen.
Observe that this stage can be executed with communication cost depth(C˜) ≤ depth(C) = d.
Since x agrees with x′ on every bit indexed by [n], and yi agrees with y′i on every bit whenever
xi = 1, it follows that xi = 1 and yi = 0. Put another way, Alice and Bob have solved the monotone
Karchmer-Wigderson game for f with communication at most t+ d, which completes the proof of
our result.
An interesting aspect of this proof is that it relies on both directions of the Karchmer-Wigderson
connection. Proposition 5.9 and previous work on monotone depth lower bounds provide a trade-off
between circuit depth and negation complexity for DeMorgan circuits solving the clique problem.
Proposition 5.10 (Raz and Wigderson [RW92]). Let k-Clique : {0, 1}(n2) → {0, 1} be the Boolean
function that is 1 if and only if the input graph G contains a clique of size k. If C is a monotone
circuit that computes k-Clique for k = n/2, then depth(C) ≥ γ · n, where γ > 0 is a fixed constant.
Corollary 5.11. There exists a fixed constant γ > 0 for which the following holds. If δ + ε ≤ γ,
then any DeMorgan circuit of depth δn solving the (n/2)-Clique problem on n-vertex graphs contains
at least εn negation gates.
This result indicates that negation gates at the bottom layer are much easier to handle from
the point of view of complexity theory than negations located at arbitrary positions of the circuit
(see also Proposition A.2 in Section A).
6 Open Problems and Further Research Directions
While our results provide some strong (indeed, optimal) bounds, they also leave open surpris-
ingly basic questions.
For example, it seems reasonable, in light of our results, to think that most cryptographic prim-
itives require Ω(log n) negations. Nevertheless, for a basic primitive like a pseudorandom generator
(that cannot be monotone), we leave open the following question: Is there a pseudorandom gener-
ator computed with a single negation gate? We stress that our question refers to a single circuit
with multiple output bits computing the PRG. If one can use different circuits for distinct output
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bits, then the work of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [AIK06] provides strong evidence that
there are PRGs computed with a constant number of negations.
Having negation gates at the bottom level may be easier to study, and with some work we
can show (in results omitted from the current paper) that no function with large enough stretch
computed with a single negation at the bottom layer can be a small-bias generator (and thus not
a pseudorandom generator either).
Another important open problem relates to the negation complexity of WPRF (weak pseudoran-
dom functions, cf. Akavia et al. [ABG+14]), or, viewed from the learning perspective, weak-learning
functions computed with a single negation. While for strong PRFs, even non-adaptive ones, we
have obtained an Ω(log n) lower bound, as far as we know, there may exist WPRFs computed by
circuits with a single negation gate. Again, when restricting ourselves to negations at the bottom,
we can prove some partial results (it is not hard to prove that a function computed by a circuit
with a constant number of negations at the bottom layer cannot be a WPRF).
Finally, we have not imposed additional restrictions on the structure of Boolean functions
computing cryptographic primitives. For instance, due to efficiency concerns, it is desirable that
such circuits have depth as small as possible, without compromising the security of the underlying
primitive. It is known that Markov’s upper bound of O(log n) negations fails under restrictions of
this form (cf. Santha and Wilson [SW93]; see also Hofmeister [Hof92]). In particular, this situation
sheds some light into why practical implementations have far more negations (or XORs) when
compared to the theoretical lower bounds described in our work. Here we have not investigated
this phenomenon, and it would be interesting to see if more specific results can be obtained in the
cryptographic context.
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A The Flow of Negations in Boolean Circuits
In this section we discuss how to move negations in a Boolean circuit in order to explore different
aspects of these gates.
A.1 Moving Negations to the Top of the Circuit
For convenience of the reader, we include here a proof for the following structural result about
negation gates.
Lemma (Blais et al. [BCO+14]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by a
circuit C with at most t negations. Then f can be written as f(x) = h(g1(x), . . . , gT (x)), where
each function gi is monotone, T = O(2
t), and h is either the parity function, or its negation.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 4.3 that if a Boolean function f is computed by a circuit with t
negations, then k
def
= a(f) ≤ O(2t). The claimed result follows easily once we “f -slice” the boolean
hypercube, as described next. For any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, let
Ti = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | a(f, Y ) ≤ i, for any chain Y starting at x}.
Observe that Ti is a monotone set: if x ∈ Ti and x  y, then y ∈ Ti. In addition, it is clear that
T0 ⊂ T1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Tk = {0, 1}n. Finally, for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, it is not hard to see that
Ti+1 \ Ti 6= ∅, since k = a(f).
Let S0
def
= T0. Observe that 1
n ∈ T0, hence S0 is nonempty. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, set
Sj
def
= Tj \ Tj−1. It follows from the preceding discussion that the family S = {S0, S1, . . . , Sk} is a
partition of the n-dimensional boolean cube into nonempty sets.
Next, we prove the following claim: There exists a vector b = (b0, b1, . . . , bk) ∈ {0, 1}k+1 with
the following properties:
(i) For each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and for any xi ∈ Si, we have f(xi) = bi.
(ii) For each 0 < i ≤ k, we have bi = 1− bi−1.
(iii) For each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, given any xi ∈ Si, there exist elements x0, x1, . . . , xi−1 in S0, S1, . . . , Si−1,
respectively, such that Y = (xi, xi−1, . . . , x0) is a chain starting at xi with a(f, Y ) = i.
Further, every proper chain Y starting at xi with a(f, Y ) = i is of this form, i.e., its elements
belong to distinct sets Sj , where j < i.
The construction of this vector and the proof of these items is by induction on i ∈ [0, k]. For
i = 0, we set b0 = f(1
n), and observe that the result is true using the definition of S0 and T0.
Consider now an element yi ∈ Si, where i > 0, and assume that items (i), (ii), and (iii) hold for
26
any smaller index. Since yi ∈ Si, there exists a proper chain Y = (yi, yi−1, . . . , y0) with a(f, Y ) = i.
Since this chain cannot be extended to a larger chain starting at yi, it follows from the induction
hypothesis that, for every 0 < j ≤ i, f(yj) = 1 − f(yj−1) = 1 − bj−1. In particular, we can set
bi = 1 − bi−1, since our initial element yi ∈ Si was arbitrary. Finally, the remaining part of item
(iii) follows once we consider the subchain Y ′ = (yi−1, . . . , y0), and apply the induction hypothesis.
Finally, we use items (i) and (ii) to prove the lemma. Recall that every family Ti is monotone,
where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. In other words, there exist k + 1 monotone functions gi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
such that g−1i (1) = Ti, where i ∈ [0, k]. As observed before, Sk = Tk \ Tk−1 is nonempty. In partic-
ular, 0n ∈ Sk. If f(0n) = 0, we let h : {0, 1}k+1 → {0, 1} be the parity function
∑k
j=0 yi (mod 2).
Otherwise, we let h be the complement of the parity function. It follows from (i) and (ii) that, for
every x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have f(x) = h(g0(x), . . . , gk(x)), which completes the proof.
By relaxing the assumption on h, we can prove the following effective version of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by a circuit C of size s containing
t negation gates, where t ≥ 0. Then f can be written as f(x) = h(g1(x), . . . , gT (x)), where each
function gi is computed by a monotone circuit of size at most s, T = 2
t+1 − 1, and h : {0, 1}T →
{0, 1} is computed by a circuit of size at most 5T .
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. The base case t = 0 is trivial. Now let t ≥ 1, and
assume the statement holds for any function computed by circuits with at most t′ < t negations.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function computed by a circuit C of size s that contains
t negations. Let x1, . . . xn, f1, . . . , fs be the functions computed at each internal node of C, and
df1e, . . . , dfse be the corresponding gates, i.e., each dfie ∈ {AND,OR,NOT}. Furthermore, assume
that this sequence is a topological sort of the nodes of the circuit, in the sense that the inputs of
each gate dfie are fi1(x) and fi2(x), with i1, i2 < i. Let i∗ ∈ [s] be the index of the first NOT gate
in C according to this sequence.
Consider a new circuit C ′ over n + 1 variables x1, . . . , xn, y, where C ′ computes exactly as
C, except that the output value of fi∗ is replaced by the new input y. By construction, C
′ is a
circuit of size at most s containing t′ def= t − 1 negations, and it computes some Boolean function
f ′ : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1}. Applying the induction hypothesis, we get that
f ′(~x, y) = h′(g′1(~x, y), . . . , g
′
T ′(~x, y)), (6)
where each g′i is computed by a monotone circuit of size at most s, T
′ ≤ 2t′+1−1, and h′ : {0, 1}T ′ →
{0, 1} admits a circuit of size 5T ′. In addition, notice that
f(~x) =
{
f ′(~x, 1) if fi∗(~x) = 1,
f ′(~x, 0) otherwise.
(7)
Let fi be the input wire of dfi∗e. Since dfi∗e = NOT, we obtain using Equation 7 that
f(~x) = h˜(fi(~x), f
′(~x, 0), f ′(~x, 1)), (8)
where h˜(z, y1, y0)
def
= yz is a function over three input bits that is computed by a circuit of size at
most 5. Furthermore, combining Equations 6 and 8, it follows that
f(~x) = h˜(fi(~x), h
′(g′1(~x, 0), . . . , g
′
T ′(~x, 0)), h
′(g′1(~x, 1), . . . , g
′
T ′(~x, 1)))
= h(fi(~x), g
′
1,0(~x), . . . , g
′
T ′,0(~x), g
′
1,1(~x), . . . , g
′
T ′,1(~x)),
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ndwhere g′j,b(~x)
def
= g′j(~x, b), for j ∈ [T ′] and b ∈ {0, 1}, and h : {0, 1}2T
′+1 → {0, 1} is the function
obtained by setting
h(v0, v1, . . . , vT ′ , vT ′+1, . . . , v2T ′)
def
= h˜(v0, h
′(v1, . . . , vT ′), h(vT ′+1, . . . , v2T ′)).
Using our assumption on i∗, it follows that fi is computed by a monotone circuit of size s. It is
also clear that each g′j,b admits a monotone circuit of size s. Further, observe that
2T ′ + 1 ≤ 2(2t′+1 − 1) + 1 = 2(2t − 1) + 1 = 2t+1 − 1 def= T.
Finally, using the induction hypothesis and the upper bound on the circuit size of h˜, we get that h
is computed by a circuit of size at most
5 + 5T ′ + 5T ′ = 5(2T ′ + 1) = 5T,
which completes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
It is possible to show that the upper bound on T in the statement of Lemma 7 is essentially
optimal. This follows from the connection between the number of negation gates in a Boolean
circuit for a function f and the alternation complexity of f , as discovered by Markov [Mar58] (see
e.g. Blais et al. [BCO+14] for further details).
A.2 Moving Negations to the Bottom of the Circuit
We recall the following basic fact about negations.
Fact A.1. Let C be a Boolean circuit of size s containing a negation gate at depth d ≥ 1. Then C
can be transformed into an equivalent circuit C ′ of size s without this negation gate that contains
at most 2d−1 additional negations at the bottom layer.
Proof. The result is immediate from the application of DeMorgan rules for Boolean connectives.
We observe below that this result is optimal. Put another way, a negation gate at an arbitrary
location can be more powerful than a linear number of negations at the bottom layer.
Proposition A.2. There exists an explicit Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that admits a
linear size circuit C containing a single negation gate, but for which any equivalent circuit C ′ with
negation gates at the bottom layer only requires n negations.
Proof. Let f(x) = 1 if and only if x = 0n. Clearly, f can be computed by a circuit with a single
negation, since this function is the negation of a monotone function. The lower bound follows
using an argument from [KS14]. Assume that f(x) = D(x, (x ⊕ β)), where D is a monotone
circuit. We need to prove that βi = 1 for every i ∈ [n]. Consider inputs z def= 0n and ei def=
0i−110n−i. By definition, f(z) = 1 and f(ei) = 0, thus D(0n, 0n ⊕ β) = D(0n, β) = 1 and
D(ei, ei ⊕ β) = D(ei, β⊕i) = 0. If βi = 0, then (0n, β) ≺ (ei, β⊕i), and since D is monotone, we
get D(0n, β) ≤ D(ei, β⊕i). However, this is in contradiction with the value of f on z and ei, which
implies that βi = 1.
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